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Religion beyond the Limits of
Criticism
Michael G. Vater
Department of Philosophy, Marquette University
Milwaukee, WI

Schelling’s philosophy of religion was the work of a lifetime of
philosophical activity, considerably larger in ambition and accomplishment
than the loose assemblage of questions usually collected under that name:
the existence of deity, responsibility for evil, and immortality.

Schelling is the most difficult of the ‘German Idealists’ to fit into
a consistent historical narrative and the least amenable of that
generation of thinkers to philosophical reconstruction or contemporary
retrieval. Part of this is due to entanglements early in his career with
philosophical alliances and polemics, part with what the public
perceived as shifts in his philosophical focus, and part with a refusal to
stay on the high road of Kant’s narrative about modernity’s conflicting
claims of rationalism and empiricism, which could only be reconciled in
a critical recognition of the secure but hybrid nature of empirical
knowledge―its content derived from sensation, its form secured by
empty concepts furnished by reason. Schelling appreciated well
enough Kant’s conceptual precision; he chaffed, though, at Kant’s
legislation of the limits of philosophy’s competence: a metaphysics of
experience, a formalistic morality, strictures placed on the artist’s and
scientist’s imagination, and the reduction of religion to morality
without remainder—which meant, in Germany, accommodation with
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the political status quo. In his willingness to return to pre-critical
sources of inspiration such as Plato, Spinoza and Leibniz, his
incorporation of religious theme voiced by heterodox figures such
Giordano Bruno, Joachim di Fiore, and Jacob Böhme, and his
seemingly quixotic fight against Newtonian optics and the methods of
hypothesis-formation and experimental test practiced by the working
scientists of his day, Schelling seemed in his own day to court ridicule.
However one tries to fit him into the narratives of other movements
and figures—the rise of German Idealism, the end of idealism, the
origin of existentialism, the end of metaphysics, Christian systematic
theology, the beginnings of psychoanalysis—he presents features that
resist incorporation and make him an outlier.i
Schelling and Hegel both started lecturing on the history of
philosophy early in the nineteenth century when they had fairly similar
positions, and in their mature years they used these lectures to
critique each other’s positions. Hegel’s students Michelet, Erdmann,
and in their wake Richard Kroner, perfected a polemic style of
historiography that minimized Schelling’s role in the formulation of
‘absolute’ or ‘objective idealism’. Hegel’s jibe that Schelling conducted
his philosophical education in public had quite a bit of play. At the turn
of the twentieth century even a sympathetic critic who called Schelling
the “prince of the romantics” found no less than six phases in the
development of his philosophy and in a less than kindly turn of phrase
dubbed him ‘Protean.’ii
In the first decade or so of his philosophical writings Schelling
published a prodigious amount at a very fast clip, not troubling himself
to carefully note changes in position, and often engaging in behind the
scenes machinations with past and present colleagues such as Fichte
and Hegel. The times were turbulent: first Reinhold, then Fichte
secured some recognition as systematizers of Kant’s critical
philosophy, but when Reinhold turned from idealistic epistemology to
objective logic and Kant repudiated the Wissenschaftslehre, there was
no obvious successor to Kant. The conversations and literary
exchanges between Lessing, his literary heir Mendelsohn and Jacobi
about Spinoza’s naturalism or ‘pantheism’ and theistic alternatives to it
made the intellectual situation in Germany about as fractious as the
streets of Paris had been a decade earlier. Nothing of Schelling’s early
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publications secured him notice as an independent voice until his
audacious attempts to graft a philosophical account of nature onto the
stalk of Fichte’s moral systematization of Kant’s philosophy. Indeed his
invention of Naturphilosophie was the first of three ‘audacities’, if I
might use the term-- philosophical turns or revisions of outlook that
were novel or ‘unforeseeable’ in some sense and resumptive or
surprisingly continuous in another. Schelling forces the critic to dance
a step more lively than the simple two-step of a pre-critical Kant and a
critical Kant, or a logical Wittgenstein and an ordinary language
Wittgenstein. Changes in his system occur in a seismic or geological
way—Schelling will later argue that the decision whereby one adopts
one’s character is preconscious, repressed, and beyond recollection.
Less charitably, it has of course been argued that Schelling was
insufficiently self-conscious of the drift of his thought.
I do not have the luxury of arguing for it at length here, but let
me suggest that an analogy with musical composition might throw
some light on Schelling’s philosophizing. There are continuous or
recurring themes, voiced predominantly or subtly, transposed to
different registers and elaborated at length (argument) or with sudden
flashes of insight, and executed in progressions of extended
dissonance or sudden resolution. This image may capture both some
of the complexity of Schelling’s work and the uncanny way nothing
ever drops out or is left aside. But given that since Aristotle,
philosophy has largely hued to the path of propositional truth and
eschewed the tropes of Socratic irony or Platonic mythologizing, if one
took this suggestion seriously Schelling would stand condemned by his
own words, for his own account of artistic creativity puts the artist in
the service of her work, condemned evermore to do more than she
can say.iii Making Schelling the philosopher of the unconscious, or the
forefather of psychoanalysis, invites the same difficulty.
Be that as it may, there are three movements to Schelling’s
thought, or three audacities: (1) Naturphilosophie, or the turn to a
metaphysics of nature to show that, pace Jacobi’s reading of Spinoza,
nothing has ever left the absolute—or that the finite does not exist
from its own side. Once this absolute or objective idealism is
sufficiently articulated, the second audacity is: (2) to leave this
ontologically founded idealism behind as a surpassed moment in the
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risk of a freedom so radical that it is free from all being, and especially
necessary being. The third audacity is the synthesis of this uncanny
mash-up of freedom and necessity in the grandest of all narratives
European civilization produced: (3) the history or life-careers of God
and humankind, as modelled in the mythologies of various ancient
civilizations and Christian revelation. Each successive phase brings the
prior forward, but fundamentally modifies it. Schelling’s philosophy of
religion is his whole philosophy, put before the public sequentially over
a period of nearly half a century. I think Schelling articulated it for
himself in a bare fifteen years, however, from the 1800 System of
Transcendental Idealism and essays of the Zeitschrift für speculative
Physik (1800-1801) to the 1804 Philosophy and Religion, the 1809
Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom, to
the cryptic 1815 lecture to the Bavarian Academy, The Deities of
Samothrace.iv

Why Is There Something and Not Nothing?
As a gifted student and young writer, Schelling displayed an
ambition to surpass the received wisdom of the day about what were
appropriate and inappropriate subjects of philosophy. Student
notebooks on Plato’s physics and metaphysics of nature thematize the
transient nature of the elements, and, rather than focusing on
Timaeus’ pictorial account of imitation of the ideas, concentrate on the
plastic nature of the receptacle or primary matter, invoking Philebus’
category the

ἄπειρον.v Schelling will later argue that Naturphilosophie,

which can be included within an embracing philosophical idealism
because it refuses independent existence to the entities of nature and
demonstrates that nature’s operations reintegrate difference back into
primordial identity, has but one problem: the construction of matter.vi
A series of early essays that imitate the structure of the first version of
Fichte’s Wissenschaftslehre share Fichte’s vision of completing or
systematizing Kant’s critical philosophy, but not his vision of what Kant
called “the primacy of the practical.” The young philosopher instead
seems to hope for a logical-metaphysical completion of the Kantian
project based on Kant’s incomplete deduction of the categories, his
discussion of God as the summum or Inbegriff of all concepts, and his
remarks on the necessarily systematic form of philosophy.vii Symbolic
of differences that will emerge between the two thinkers, where Fichte
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writes das Ich in 1794, Schelling writes “the absolute appearing in
us.”viii Remarks on the insufficiency of the ontological argument, on the
nature of modal categories and the origin time are scattered
throughout the early writings, but these themes will not converge until
1802-1804 when Schelling makes it clear that in intellectual intuition,
being cannot be conceived in any way other than as self-existent or
necessarily existent. Coming to clarity on this will be the apogee of
Schelling’s early Spinozism. As we shall see, however, since Schelling
adopts this concept in the train of Leibniz’s peculiar phrasing of the
ontological question: why is there something and not nothing?, and
Kant’s classification of modal predicates as conceptual, hence lacking
ontological freight, necessary being is an inherent dialectical or selfundercutting concept, applicable only to something that contingently
exists. This, of course, will not become clear to Schelling until he
moves away from the absolutism of the Naturphilosophie (or
philosophy of identity) and comes up with a novel definition of God’s
contingent existence as a state of being consequent upon utter
freedom or original decision.
In the midst of disputes with Fichte about the nature and
direction of transcendental idealism after Kant, Schelling veered
sharply toward Spinozism and its naturalistic perspective, and away
from the psychology of the moral life which was the undergirding of
Fichte’s 1794 Wissenschaftslehre. Though the dialectical
argumentation of that work would remain fundamental to Schelling’s
elaboration of the Potencies or (conceptual) levels of being in the
unfolding of his philosophies of nature, freedom, and religion,
Schelling’s 1801 Presentation of My System of Philosophy leveled the
charge of subjectivism against Fichte’s idealism and proclaimed itself a
“philosophy of identity.”ix Some thirty years later, after he had twice
made fundamental alterations in his philosophy in order to recast it as
a dynamic and double-sided (conceptual and existential) account of
the life of God and humankind, Schelling reconsiders the label and
deems all of his work prior to the 1809 meditations on radical freedom
Naturphilosophie. After Hegel’s death and perhaps anxious to
distinguish his own early position from what Hegel had called
‘objective idealism’ and Schelling now called mere negative or
conceptual philosophy, Schelling returns to 1800 System of
Transcendental Idealism which views nature as self-objectification of a
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transcendental subject. In effect, in the Munich lectures on History of
Modern Philosophy, Schelling covers his tracks and minimizes the
extent of his experimentation in his journey from Fichtean disciple to
philosopher of nature to Spinozist metaphysician.x Thinking he had
placed himself beyond it, Schelling himself invents the From Kant to
Hegel narrative that will eventually assign to him a role no larger than
an entr’acte—a stagehand of Spirit.
There are three features of the Naturphilosophy 1800-1804 that
deserve extensive comment. The first is the uninterrupted and
continuous nature of the metaphysical ‘deduction’ (or construction) of
being and its potencies and the consideration of the operations of
nature which minimize the at-first-glance independence of the items of
appearance and reveal that their true being is interdependent or
organic. The second is the way that reason’s consideration of the being
of the absolute is framed either as immanent (or nondual) version of
the classical ontological argument for divine existence or is framed in
highly dialectical spin that Leibniz gave to ontology: why is there
something and not nothing? The third is way the metaphysical
question of individuation—or egress from the absolute—is made
coextensive with an account of the origin of time, and both are given a
voluntaristic account. Individuals have run away from home: the telos
of unfolding phenomena is to invite the prodigals to return. Looking at
these three themes, one might want to say that from early on
Schelling’s primary domain of endeavor is philosophy of religion. As
late as 1804, however, in discussions with his Fichtean friend
Eschenmeyer, Schelling will admit of no sense to the term ‘God’ that
transcends the absolute that reason can adumbrate, Spinoza’s deus
sive natura.xi Schelling is not yet ready to imitate the theistic turn that
Fichte took after 1800.
[1] From first to last, Schelling insists that the philosopher of
nature re-enacts the original being of nature, which is active or
expressive, self-affecting, and therefore self-structuring in ways that
higher levels or ‘exponents’ of organization reflect and resume lower
levels. Matter or the filling of three-dimensional space is the nadir of
nature’s self-expression, and appears to mere perception as passive or
inert, subject only to mechanic—externally imposed—motion. But what
at first appears to be external and separated turns out to be internally
The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism, (2014): pg. 499-517. Publisher Link. This article is © Palgrave-Macmillan
Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave-Macmillan
Publishing does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Palgrave-Macmillan Publishing.

6

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

related, active, and pointed toward dimensions of interiority such as
sensation, perception and intuition. The organism, the self-regulating
entity that is the home and support for intelligence in humans, is
nothing different from matter, but is a knot of activity and
purposiveness supervenient upon this lowest and all subsequent levels
of inorganic elaboration—phenomena the physical sciences call gravity,
conduction, cohesion, electromagnetism and reactivity to light. In a
suitably subdued and thoroughly predictable manner, nature is a work
of necessitated activity.
The systematic aspect of Naturphilosophie comes from two
sources, the philosopher’s reconstruction of the complex web of
interconnection and reactions that nature does all at once in a
successive or narrative fashion and the repetition of basic logical
strategies that nature itself enacts from its own side in constructing
complex strategies. To elaborate the first conjunct, there is
emergence, development, metamorphosis—Schelling even uses the
Anglophone term ‘Evolution’—in nature, but this is the philosopher’s
free contribution or condescension to the very human need to
understand by way of story; Schelling is pre-Darwinian and too
Aristotelian to befriend randomness. Regarding the second, nature
itself seems to have hit upon a set of basic organization strategies that
it repeats, whether one looks at higher-level structures like inorganic,
organic and intelligent life, mid-level structures (called dynamic
processes) such as magnetism, electricity, and transmission of light, or
the three dimensions of space. All of these are amenable to
mathematical treatment; the logical distinctions of identity, difference,
and totality (relative identity) can be mapped on a single continuous
line and treated as negative and positive numbers. Schelling calls
these repetitive structures potencies [Potenzen]—the term suggests
power or capacity, and, derivatively, exponent or mathematical
power.xii He also makes it into a verb [Potenzierung] which suggests
an ability to manifest on a higher level or to jump levels. It is part of
Schelling’s ‘deep Spinzoism’, never questioned or rejected, that,
nothing standing in the way, being entails a capacity to realize itself or
more fully express itself: to be is strive [conatus]. Once the concept of
potencies is framed, it never leaves Schelling’s vocabulary.
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Despite Schelling’s systematic intent, elaborated in the FichteSchelling Correspondence, of framing a three-part system with a
Spinozistic theory of identity and difference replacing the genetic
scheme of activity, production and intuition modeled in the 1800
System of Transcendental Idealism, Schelling was unable in years
following his break with Fichte to produce a philosophy of spirit or
consciousness equal in detail to his Naturphilosophie—with the
exception of some lectures on the Philosophy of Art in 1802 that
prefigure his interest in mythology and religion but were highly
dependent on Winkelmann’s classicism. Versions of Schelling’s system
published in 1801 and disseminated in lectures in 1804 keep Spinoza
in the foreground. Thanks to the increasingly general idea of the
potencies, Schelling is able to move from metaphysics—the account of
the embracing character of the absolute and the pseudo-independence
of finite particulars ―to the general and then the increasingly more
specific features of nature. Schelling had taken a naturalistic turn in
his disputes with Fichte and though he showed great ingenuity in
turning to Platonic theory of ideas in trying to solve the problem of
individuation, or the apparent self-separation of the individual from the
absolute, he has much greater success in arguing that nature is a
physical proof of idealism in the way that its operations and processes
themselves undo separation.
[2] Though Naturphilosophie takes its proximate inspiration
from Spinoza and takes the Platonic Timaeus as its template and so
unsurprisingly depends on the notion of the absolute’s necessary
existence, there is an element of insecurity or nonbeing included in the
concept from the first. It is this element of dialectical vulnerability that
makes necessary existence contingent and eliminable in later phases
of Schelling’s thought, where the divine itself gambles away the “sure
thing” of its necessary being to risk a career of freedom and a life as
spirit. We will come to this knot of difficult and original ideas in due
time; for now I wish to show that early in his career as an absolute
idealist or one of the co-inventors of negative philosophy, there was
something wobbly in what was claimed was the absolute’s intrinsic
nature: that its very idea guaranteed its reality.
In the first announcement of the so-called system of identity,
Schelling claims that once it has turned aside from subjectivism, from
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the I and its perspectival representations, philosophy can function in
the pure ether of reason. It reconceives the items of experience in a
fundamentally mathematical or geometrical form; its philosophical task
from that point on is to rationally construct (we would say
‘reconstruct’) on metaphysical and naturalistic lines the particulars and
genera of our experience until we achieve the degree of closure and
validity that a hypothetical or nonfoundationalist account permits. To
this constructed absolute and the intuition of the philosopher who does
the constructing is ascribed not factual being, but logical-mathematical
necessity. Yet there is a suspicion that this whole logical edifice is a
fable, what Kant would cheerfully call a Hirngespinst. Schelling
announces, “Reason’s thought is foreign to everyone; to conceive it as
absolute, and thus to come to the standpoint I require, one must
abstract from the one that does the thinking.”xiii But can we humans
abstract from ourselves? Ought we try to?
Three years later, in the System der gesamten Philosophie,
Schelling rethinks the identity theory which grounds Naturphilosophie
in a more rigorous way, working again from Spinoza, but not a literal
reading of the Ethics, where Spinoza had largely been content to
elucidate the unity and necessary existence of substance through
preliminary definitions and axioms. Instead Schelling fashions an
ontology of power in which primal being is seen not just to be selfconstituting but self-expressive; the concept of expressivity explains
what Spinoza could not explain, how attributes and modes follow from
substance’s self-sufficient being. When it comes to expressing how the
absolute or god/nature exists, Schelling invokes the ultimate question
that “vertiginous intellect” can pose: why is there something rather
than nothing?, and finds that in luminous, lightning-like clarity reason
is pulled back from the abyss and realizes the impossibility of
nonbeing.xiv I have elsewhere called this Schelling’s Hitchcockean
moment, his ontological cliffhanger—not just because there is a
moment of high drama in this isolated text, but because, once
articulated, the suspicion that nothing was not in fact impossible turns
into the worm coiled in the fruit of Schelling’s whole previous
philosophy and which turns the ruby promise of necessary existence
into the mundane brown rot of contingency. Schelling will return to
Kant and admit that modal predicates are just predicates, while
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existence is something else: God or the absolute exists necessarily, if
it exists.xv
[3] The third feature that Schelling carries forward from the
identity-theory phase of Naturphilosophie to the later philosophies of
freedom and religion is the notion that the finite particular’s selfpositing—its decree, as it were, that it is the point of origin from which
all perspectives are to be calculated—is its positing of time. While
existing in the absolute or in the idea it is essentially the same as the
universal, and so related to every other particular, but when it
separates itself from the absolute or ‘falls’ into finite existence, its
relationships to others are parsed out as successors to some and
predecessor to others, or as past and future. The individuality of the
particular entity in its ersatz declaration of independence constitutes
its ‘finite identity,’ its point of view, its subjectivity, or to say the same
in Kantian terms, its temporality. xvi
While the doctrine of the ‘fall’ of finite beings is a somewhat
quizzical feature of Naturphilosophie, where it provides another
opening for the critique of Fichtean subjective Idealism, the idea of
free decision and the ability of a free being to abandon modes of being
formerly necessary (or at least ‘in character’) gives Schelling the
occasion for defining what radical freedom might be: not ‘arbitrary
choice’--which at best would signal only confusion about one’s
character and environment-- but putting what has been compulsory or
purely necessary behind oneself as ‘past’ and moving on into the
novel. The time of freedom comes from futurity; the accounting of
necessity embraces the past, and if we find the later Schelling
believable, stops there. Falling into addiction is a story of conditioning
and the economy of neurotransmitters; entering recovery is quite
different. As we shall see, the life of God is an experiment in
recovery—from addiction to necessary being and from isolation within
it.

Decision: Separating the Divine Yes and No
We have just had to make a move from abstract ontology to
lived human psychology in order to understand a move that Schelling
makes. While his stock of erudition in classical philosophy, the history
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of Christian theology, and the cultures of antiquity replete with their
myths and artistic accomplishment grows weightier as he ages,
Schelling’s approach to philosophy and religion becomes more simple
or classical, and less burdened with the methodological and
epistemological self-consciousness of modernity. Increasingly the
mature Schelling adopts the standpoint of medieval Christian and
renaissance philosophies that place humankind in the center of things
and work by analogy between the microcosm and the macrocosm. As
the first text of the radically new philosophy of freedom announces,
“Only man is in God and is capable of freedom through this being-inGod. He alone is a being of the centrum [ein Centralwesen] and for
that reason he should also remain in the centrum. All things are
created in it just as God only accepts nature and ties it to himself
through man.”xvii This antiquarian guise will hardly endear Schelling to
the empiricist, or one who waits for science to endorse her philosophy.
It frankly returns to reader to a prescientific framework where myth,
narrative, and religious traditions traced the horizons of human
consciousness. And if we are not entirely comfortable with this when
we read the arguments of the German Idealists with a hope for a
retrieval that meets our current needs, we should remember there was
quite an obstinate antiquarian streak, extending even to a love of
things medieval and Catholic, which seized the souls of their literary
and artistic friends.
Although it is conventional to distinguish Schelling’s middle
philosophy or philosophy of freedom from his late philosophy or
philosophies of mythology and revelation, there is considerable overlap
between the two. As one might gather from the title of the work that
inaugurated the middle philosophy, the 1809 Philosophical
Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Matters
Connected to It, Schelling’s interest is philosophical and his method is
argumentative; a great deal of the work is devoted to showing that the
systematic intent of the earlier Naturphilosohie can only be carried out
by substituting a version of the principle of sufficient reason for the
concept of the sameness or identity of the different that had previously
been advanced as the system principle. Schelling concedes that his
earlier philosophy had hoped in vain to find a logic connecting the
orders of nature and that of spirit (self-conscious agents). Now a
dynamic principle is invoked instead, freedom, the logic of which
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demands that novelty can occur or that existence float free of
conditioning ground. On the basis of this new way of thinking first
things, Schelling is able to fashion a narrative in which a living God is
able to leave primordial or necessary existence, risk life in creative
freedom, let nature and humankind go forth as separate, in order to
become spirit and reunite with created spiritual being. A smaller
problematic, the possibility and origin of evil, and where to place
responsibility for evil, is embedded in the larger scheme—the classical
project of theodicy. The late philosophy, begun in 1820 but not widely
disseminated until twenty years later, takes over this narrative of the
divine and human life careers, but attempts to trace it out in great
detail in the mythological narratives and religious views of prior
historical civilizations, calling itself positive philosophy or philosophy of
revelation. Though Schelling claimed he was in no sense dependent on
Christian dogmatics and it was not his intent to do systematic
theology, he comes close to a complete elaboration of the so-called
‘truths’ of Christian revelation, but in a historical or ‘empirical’ mode.
Another thing to note as we embark on the philosophies of
freedom and revelation is that though Schelling continues to criticize
the subjectivism of a narrow idealism, when he rejects Fichte’s
idealism he is rejecting the primacy of the I and its incessant
monologue about perceptions and arbitrary choices. He has learned
from the Pietists, the poets, and from the detail argumentation of the
first Wissenschaftslehre that there are many prompters, deciders,
valuators and judges packed into our skins and that Fichte’s
watchword: my being is my own deed, was true in many senses that
consciousness most often will not or cannot acknowledge. As Goethe’s
Faust rewrites the gospel, “In the beginning was the deed,” putting
‘word’ and the obvious mental process under erasure.xviii The
generation of critics who want to view Schelling as the forefather of
psychoanalysis finds ample support in the writing of Schelling’s middle
phase: the Philosophical Investigations of Human Freedom, the
Stuttgart Lectures, and the drafts of Ages of the World. Schelling does
not think, however, that the divine is a projection of the human
imagination, as Feuerbach, Freud and perhaps William Blake thought,
but that the two mirror each other in identical intertwined careers.
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In this section, we will look closely to two central issues:
Schelling’s definition of freedom and the nature of the two principles of
being that allow for it. I shall not stress his treatment of the issue of
evil and the question of divine responsibility for it, for in the middle
period Schelling seems prone to relapse into pantheism just when he
declares himself free of its snares. The account offered in the
philosophy of religion is more successful and more difficult to argue:
creation entails that God excretes the nondivine element within itself,
and this rejected element becomes the cosmic Christ wherein
humankind is created, falls, and is redeemed in Christ’s acceptance
into deity. The simple account of Schelling’s theology is that the
Menschwerdung Gottes implies the Gotteswerdung Menschen and vice
versa and that in a process of clarification or refinement [Verklärung]
evil and the “irreducible remainder” of nature will somehow be
sublimated.xix
[1] Before we can appreciate Schelling’s novel 1809 definition of
freedom, both human and divine, we must carefully look at a defense
of Spinozistic necessity or ‘decidedness’ that Schelling offered in 1804
in the context of a discussion of the demands of a religious morality.
Neither so-called arbitrary choice nor empirical lawfulness, the
standards advanced by Kant, will suffice, says Schelling, but only an
unconditional trust in the necessity that rules all. Spinoza, especially in
his teaching on the ‘intellectual love of God’, recaptured the ancients’
sense of virtue: not arbitrary freedom but choiceless resolve
[Entschiedenheit] for the right. The highest moral and cognitive
standard that religion can advance is conscientiousness
[Gewissenhaftigkeit], not the subjective standard of devotion or feeling
offered by contemporary theories.xx There is no absolute standard of
right [Sittlichkeit] that is the achievement or possession of the isolated
individual; one is sittlich or virtuous only insofar as one is bound to do
what is right without any consideration of its opposite. –This is as
impassioned a piece of argument as one can find in all of Schelling’s
writings. He is not seeking easy solutions or conceptual loopholes; this
is a soldierly morality that he espouses, one that commands fidelity to
the situation the agent finds herself in. And it is absolutely consistent
with Spinoza’s teaching of universal necessity—which, when
understood and trusted, is amor intellectualis dei. Schelling takes aim
at Enlightenment fables of human perfectibility, infinite moral (or
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revolutionary!) progress, and the futurity of blessedness, and longs
instead for the recurrence of a golden past, morality as spokes
radiating from a single wheel, not the spectacle of humanity wandering
in a circle. This is the morality of necessary being, the divine decree.xxi
[2] What can be said to alter this rigid view? What alternatives
can there be, when the necessity of the necessarily existent has
defined the position of every point and the conditions of every ‘agent’,
when inner determinations of virtue and power correspond only to
outer determinations of destiny and fate? First of all, there is no need
to soften the view: what is viewed from the outside as necessary is
seen on the interior as decision or free act of will. Kant had articulated
this basic view when he argued that the free act is outside of all causal
connection, or outside of time. Empirically, the only evidence for a free
act is the occurrence of new series of phenomena, but the decision or
free act itself is outside of time—and even the agent has no privileged
access to it. What the addict really wanted or did when she nominally
started on a ‘recovery’ will surprise her as much as those around her
when the consequences of her new course of action unfold. –Fichte
had said: the I is its own deed, consciousness is self-positing. The I is
really nothing other than self-positing, remarks Schelling, but it is not
coextensive with consciousness. All self-apprehension or cognition
presupposes something deeper, being which is fundamental willing,
which makes itself into something and is the ground of all modes of
being.
But this account of the individual’s deed, if it settles the smaller
question of the individual’s freedom, character, and responsibility for
the good or evil that in a sense it is, raises larger questions that
Schelling struggles to answer in light of his prior commitment to an
identity of different principles in the absolute and his new stance of
looking at the development of spirit in terms of will, or of a conflict of
wills. In moving from the pantheism of Naturphilosophie to creationism
of the Investigations, ontological commitments have shifted: in the
former there was one agent (natura naturans) and one self-conscious
being (finite spirit, the last level of the deployment of organization in
natura naturata). Now there are two agents in one complex structure
of being, both capable of spiritual activity and destined to be reunited
in love. It is striking that definition of love Schelling offers here: that
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two beings capable of being independent of each other nonetheless try
to be together, is a reprise of a description first offered in 1804 as a
depiction of attraction between sexually dimorphic animals. The logic
of love and of lust is identical.xxii
[3] One striking feature of the Investigations is the effort
Schelling makes to show that the systematic intent of Naturphilosophie
can be fulfilled only if its core logic of the essential sameness (or
indifference) of phenomenally distinct orders can be translated into a
dynamic framework suitable for agents as well as entities. The
distinction between ground and existent, employed occasionally in the
1801 philosophy of nature to characterize latent and emergent stages
of the same phenomena or potency is now used to demarcate basically
different modes of being, roughly nature and spirit, or put in
voluntaristic terms, the will to evil and the will to good. Actually the
orders of being (the contractive will of the ground and the expansive
will of love) are prior to and ontologically necessary for the moral
order. The factors that are distinguished but indissolubly united in God
are contingently united, and so dissoluble, in the human being; the
possibility for good or evil, grounded in God’s nature, becomes in
humans the reality of good and evil. –That there are human individuals
with good and bad wills, or who have chosen egoistic or altruistic
characters, according the Schelling’s earlier nonvolulntaristic
meditations, depends on their character and their ‘resolve’ or fidelity
to their different situations. The conclusion that God is therefore the
ground of possibility of good and evil, but is absolved of responsibility
for their actuality, seems unsatisfying. Oppenheimer had a pretty
definite intuition of what he had done when he saw the first atomic
explosion and uttered “We have become like gods.” What he had done
did not correspond to his original intention to solve a problem in
physics. –Schelling’s attempt to translate original principles of being
into modes of willing seems less than successful too. When he declares
with utter generality and sweeping rhetoric, “Will is primal being
[Ursein] to which alone all predicates of being apply: groundlessness,
eternality, independence from time, self-affirmation. All of philosophy
strives only to find this highest expression,” his translators remark that
he has overstepped himself and promised more than he can deliver.xxiii
Heidegger too was critical of Schelling at this point, seeing in the turn
to a philosophy of will a slip back into the metaphysics of presence.
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[4] Whatever its argumentative shortcomings, the Philosophical
Investigations show a total shift in Schelling philosophy, from a static
ontology of nature to a dynamic philosophy of religion. While the basic
story is that of the emergence of moral beings, with will and
responsibility, from the natural principle, this can in no way happen
within that principle. Freedom must be withdrawn from nature, as it
were, like Prometheus’ theft of fire, and God and humanity be
sundered as agonal combatants before they can be reunited in a
spiritual bond over the course of history. Before this explanatory
structure can be fleshed out—the basic narrative of the philosophy of
revelation-- a more satisfactory account for the independence of
nature and humanity from God must be discovered. This is work of the
multiple drafts of Ages of the World, where Schelling offers a sketch of
how the potencies evolve, contest, and fall into succession is a dreamlike exercise of imagination before the creation. The potencies are now
viewed not as external classification but as ontological structures in
their own right, self-impelled if not totally autonomous agent
functioning not as explicit will or decision, but as dream-like
apparitions of yearning and inchoate desire which deploy themselves
in ghostly forms that fall back into their sensory and appetitive
elements. Schelling distinguishes between a violent and
unpremeditated scission (or ‘decision’) among the potencies that now
and then (eternally) erupts and gives one temporary hegemony, and
the creative, presumably conscious, decision of creation wherein God
posits what is nature in it--that which is necessity or the play of mere
imagination and desire--and enters into an ordered realization of the
proto-possibilities.xxiv Schelling again comments that the deed or act of
will that is the agent of decision― and in fact ecstatically ejects the
existent from the basis of being― is preconscious and repressed.xxv
What is past is locked away as eternally past, and what is there for
consciousness is eternally cut off from its nature basis, “the irreducible
remainder.”
The entry into the philosophy of religion proper, that is, the
yoked negative and positive philosophies comes with a double
intensification of these themes: (a) the play of nonbeing or necessity
in God’s natural basis prior to the decisive separation is rethought as
leap over being, the assumption of a freedom so radical that it is
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freedom to be or not to be, that is, a complete rejection of the ‘prior’
state of necessary existence, and (b) the scission between will and
consciousness is deepened in the realization that the truth and reality
of this whole narrative is beyond conscious grasp or conceptual
explication. All philosophy that is merely negative—that is, , rational,
conceptual, and driven by logic and argumentation― can only lead up
to the bare idea of an entity with this sort of freedom, at which point it
can and must reach out in experiment or exploration to an actuality
beyond necessity and all concepts of existence.

To Be or Not to Be?
We suggested earlier that there is something like a process of
musical composition in the makeup of Schelling’s entire philosophy,
with themes voiced briefly and subtly early on swelling into
prominence later on, and conceptual elements at first seemingly
discordant eventually brought into harmonic resolution. If there is any
merit to the metaphor, it implies that Schelling must be judged by his
whole oeuvre as well as by the cogency of its elements or phases. The
philosophy of religion and, more particularly, the late philosophy of
mythology and revelation, must be taken as Schelling’s single
accomplishment. For both the necessitarian ontology of the early
Naturphilosophie and the volitional ontology of Human Freedom and
Ages of the World are brought forward and intertwined in surprising
way in Schelling’s final position. As we shall see, there are two
overwhelming obstacles to appropriating this philosophy, first, the
problem of scale or detail and, secondly, the problem of essentialism.
In his 1841/42 Berlin lecture on the Philosophy of Revelation,
Schelling first presented the philosophical outline of the positive
philosophy, then its historical and theological content which he
regarded not as mere application but as its enrichment or fulfilment. In
our eyes I fear it cannot but count as an obstacle that Schelling’s
narrative encompasses almost the whole of Christian doctrine as well
the mythologies of various ancient cultures. Our way of doing
philosophy is to isolate and reconstruct historical positions, preferably
in sparse form, and to test the merits of their premises. Admittedly all
the German Idealists cause grief in this regard, but the cumulative
nature of Schelling’s argument causes special difficulty.
The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism, (2014): pg. 499-517. Publisher Link. This article is © Palgrave-Macmillan
Publishing and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Palgrave-Macmillan
Publishing does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the
express permission from Palgrave-Macmillan Publishing.

17

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

[1] The positive philosophy begins with the critique of the
absolute idealism of Schelling’s own Naturphilosophie and Hegel’s
system of philosophy, which moved solely in concepts in abstraction
from things or sensory intuitions, and so attained a mere conceptual
legitimacy. These philosophies were systems, indeed, but detached
from any foundational reality. They could count as no more than
negative philosophy, an analytic propaedeutic to a treatment of reality
that was never furnished except in outline, at the end, and as the
result of the analytic process. Schelling essentially attained this
position in 1809 and attempted to put the Spinozism of the
Naturphilosophie behind him, seeing that his earlier philosophy has
begun and ended in the concept of the absolute as a necessary or selfexisting being. When the godhead sets out to become life, spirit, and
God, the earlier philosophy must be abandoned, but it cannot be
abandoned by any move less drastic that having the divine will,
emergent from nature, bury its eternal past and become a life. But
how can one undo necessary existence?
I have argued that there is thinness to this idea of necessary
existence from its first introduction in the identity-theory of the
Naturphilosophie. If the ontological question, properly voiced, is the
“vertiginous question”--Why is there something and not nothing?―
then from the very start being has been conceived dialectically as
infected with nonbeing, if not actually, then at least possibly. The odor
of fishiness that explorers of the ontological argument have always
smelled, though some chose to cover it with frankincense, was cleared
discerned by Descartes: God was a necessarily existent entity, if it
existed. From the side of the thinker and her thinking, necessary
existence is eliminable. As Kant saw, existence is not a concept, but a
contingent fact dependent on the state of the world.
The novelty of Schelling’s philosophy of religion is that God
clues into this situation ahead of the philosopher and remedies the lack
by exercise of will. This point is where the narrative of the 1809
Investigations becomes unclear and the drafts of the Ages of the World
fail to illuminate except by arguing on a quasi-psychoanalytic model
that deed or will must precede the arising of consciousness and must
be structurally buried underneath consciousness in such a way that
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retrieval is impossible. We shall investigate some of the ways Schelling
tries to argue this transition in the next section, but will first have to
deal with the difficult fact that Schelling in attempting to think outside
the conceptual has left the a priori for the realm of the a posteriori.
Schelling calls his new venture ‘philosophical empiricism’,
acknowledging that it can be but an open system and can have
authority only for those actively seeking along its lines. This is a form
of thinking whose object is not given prior to thought, but actively
produced by it. Its object stands beyond thought rather than being a
product of thought. Only in way can Jacobi’s demand for some reality
beyond human feeling and imagination be met.xxvi
[2] Since positive philosophy is an experimental rather than an
analytical enterprise, a voyage of discovery and not a cartographical
expedition, Schelling’s texts in this period are full of neologisms and
overlapping conceptual distinctions, none of which can be said to
exactly designate their objects. Earlier attempts to talk of deity as the
self-distinguishing process of
Essence [Wesen] and Existence
Being [Seyn] and the Existent [Seyendes]
are superseded in the 1841/42 lectures by
Unvordenkliche ,blind,
or necessary being

and

ontological capacity [Seinkönnen],
will, or godhead [Gottheit].xxvii,xxviii

Furthermore, all versions of these contrasts are pervaded by the late
Platonic contrast between nonbeing and being [μἡ

ὄν and ὄν], the

dark and light principles which from the earliest days had occupied
Schelling’s imagination and which could function in either natural or
moral environments, becoming contraction and expansion in the
former, and self-will (evil) or universal will in the latter.
Crucial to the positive philosophy is the situation that the
subject, not the observing philosopher, makes these distinctions,
which means that by the power of necessary and inconceivable being,
contingency emerges from necessity and, uniting necessity and
contingency in itself, becomes God—Lord over being. As in the middle
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philosophy, Schelling thinks this occurs through willing, primordially a
withdrawal from necessity or the assumption of freedom over both
being and not-being. The necessarily existent wills itself as Sein-undNichtsein-Können, or contingently existing.xxix This breaks primordial
being, hitherto the undisturbed tranquility of groundlessness and
beginninglessness, into opposing factors: being and freedom, nature
and spirit, B and A.
In making necessity or his own primordial being other than
itself, God makes it an independent power of being and turns its
natural necessity (which is a kind of relative nonbeing) into real
possibility, capacity for being. In so doing, the contingently necessary
or living God first becomes objective in its necessary counterpart, and
only here is the possibility for consciousness situated. God finds itself
in unprethinkable being before it thinks, and it must wrench itself from
this blind or mute being before it can become a thinkers or knower.
Here, Schelling announces, is his point of divergence with Jacobi who
would posit the being and consciousness of God simultaneously.
“Instead we must proceed from an original being of God that precedes
him.”xxx There would be no point to consciousness if its sort of
knowledge were not the cognitive side of contingent being, the registry
of what happens, not of what is eternally the same.
How is this separation from primordial being possible or
conceivable? Schelling no longer seems to prize the simple category of
will; it is contingency, ability to be or not to be, that asserts itself over
blind or monotonous being and first reveals the law of being, to which
even God is subject: nothing is to remain hidden, unclear, latent—
everything is to be brought to decision. Schelling calls this is the “idea”
in the inchoate divine imagination, the intuition that it is fundamentally
other than the capacity for being which is connected to its eternal or
necessary being.xxxi
This idea is the idea of freedom; to see it is will; to act on it is to
depart from the security of being. Reality itself is inherently dialectical,
says Schelling, in such a way that the possible has more value than
the actual, the contingent than the necessary, and the novel and risky
than the ever-present. Reality is evidently popping with possibility!
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[3] The other-than-divine becomes the locus of creation:
humankind, and in the human, the natural world. The potencies, or
capacities for being which evolved out of the primordial blind being,
become independent powers, as it were, and in succession shape the
epochs of human historical existence― which are also the phases of
God’s self-revelation. Thus the abstract and ontological side of positive
philosophy turns toward history, the unfolding of human cultures, the
mythologies that are the flowering of deity in so-called pagan cultures,
and the mystery-cults of ancient Greek that lead one to the truths of
Christianity: creation, fall, redemption through a humanly suffering
God, and immortality (of sorts). This all makes for a vast narrative. We
will have to confine ourselves to three topics: creation and the human
status of Christ, Christ’s divinization and the generation of the Trinity,
and the future of human spiritual evolution. Schelling had vast
amounts of learning at his disposal in classical languages and
literatures, the history of religions, and Christian scriptures and
theology, so his narratives are engaging. What I find interesting is the
economy of his account: the three potencies in their dialectical
unfolding structure human history, the phases of religious
consciousness in ancient peoples; they also determine the internal
relationship of the deity, the so-called different ‘persons’ of the
Godhead. Also interesting is Schelling’s argument that if revelation is
universal, It cannot be confined to one people or one cultural epoch.
[a] Creation and the Christ: The Naturphilosophie pictured
humankind’s (structural) evolution inside nature, while the philosophy
of freedom did the reverse, showing nature to be a process within the
cosmic creature, humanity. The positive philosophy situates both
within what Johanine theology called the preexistent Logos, the
medium of creation. While orthodox Christian thinking identifies the
Logos with the second person of the Trinity and the earthly Christ,
Schelling identifies it with the excluded blind or pre-personal ground of
the living deity, within which humanity both takes its origin and falls
from union with the divine.xxxii It is the historical adventure of various
human cultures to mark out stages on the return to God—the basic
pattern marked by Ouranos, Chronos and Dionysus in Greek culture,
and their female counterparts Demeter, Persephone, and Cybele.
These are shapes of God, phases in revelation.xxxiii
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Within the Hebrew culture, Christ plays the same role as
Dionysus and Cybele—mediation with the ancient, harsh gods and
redemption through suffering. Christ is essentially human, the pure
human, divinized by God in response to his obedient suffering, and
thus incorporated into the godhead. That this is a purely Arian account
does not bother Schelling, who insists he is doing philosophy, not
dogmatic theology.xxxiv
[b] With the acceptance of Christ into the godhead, the Spirit is
generated as the bond between Father and Son, the principle of
sharing, and outreach. Revelation marks out stages in human history,
conceived as a single narrative with universal meaning, with the age of
the Father covering ancient times and civilizations, the age of the Son
coinciding with the domination of Rome and Europe, and the age of
the Spirit yet to come, marked by the withering away of the difference
between ecclesial and secular communities. Schelling borrows this
historicized version of the life of the Trinity from the writings of
Joachim di Fiori.xxxv As far as eschatology goes, Schelling continues to
maintain that a form of immortality or life after dead is possible, with a
sort of distillation or Verklärung of one’s moral personality; the
ontological possibility of such a transformation rests on the resonance
of the human Gemuth (soul) or the hidden unity of psyche and body
with the divine Geist (spirit), as Schelling argued in the final pages
1810 Stuttgart Lectures.xxxvi

Conclusions
We have indicated that the immensity of Schelling’s narrative
poses obstacles to its acceptance; so does the fact that it is quite
Eurocentric, despite Schelling’s attempt to argue for the validity of
non-Christian religious as being necessary steps toward God’s full
revelation in the Christian narrative. Weightier than the problem of
scale, however, is that Schelling thinks that terms such as ‘God’ and
‘man’, ‘being’ and ‘ontological capacity’ designate universal essences.
Informed by evolutionary biology, neuroscience, genetics and
emergent genomics, we have a difficult time imaging anything other
than a statistical reality to entities that we think take shape discretely
but which we continue to denominate in the old vocabulary of sortal
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nouns. Reality seems to unfold in micro-events far below the threshold
of our unaided perceptions. Though Schelling seems to have
anticipated something like the process philosophy of Whitehead and
Hartshorne, particularly in his valorization of contingency over
necessity, his religious imagination seems anchored in classic Christian
dogma and the Renaissance tradition of placing “man” in the center of
a single process of divine revelation. Paul Tillich, the one theologian
obviously influenced by Schelling, followed him closely only in matters
of terminology and periodization of the epochs of revelation. But he
accepts Schelling’s core thought only in an agnostic and relativistic
sense. It is convenient to call godhead or the Father abgründig—one
need say no more. And it is likewise convenient to define the Christ
only in terms of his acceptance as Messiah by early communities, and
completely prudent to talk of the Spirit’s presence in human
communities as ambiguous. But this is quite a dilution of Schelling’s
daring as Christian thinker.
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